What is the solution to the raven paradox?

Logically equivalent statements are presumably confirmationally equivalent. Therefore, 'all ravens are black' and 'all non-black things are non-ravens', being logically equivalent, should be confirmationally equivalent. But they aren't.

This is Hempel's so-called 'Raven paradox.'

What's the solution?

The solution is that 'all ravens are black' tends to be taken to mean that being a raven is dispositive of being black, whereas 'all non-black things are non-ravens' is not taken to mean that being non-black is dispositive of being a non-raven.

The statement 'being a raven is dispositive of being black' is not logically equivalent with 'all non-black things are non-ravens.'

The only reason this so-called 'paradox' arises is that Hempel and other philosophers of science wrongly identify causation with correlation.